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Abstract 
There is a paucity of in-depth research on the effects that enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
systems have on firm-specific intangible assets, such as firm-specific knowledge and core 
capabilities. Accordingly, this paper explores the implementation of SAP in two operational 
units of the Boxit Group—a global player in the manufacture of paper and packaging. 
Leonard-Barton’s (1995) theory of knowledge creating activities, knowledge sets, and core 
and non-core capabilities is employed as a conceptual framework to examine the 
implementation and use of SAP modules in the firm studied. The findings of this in-depth 
exploratory case study illustrate that the introduction of SAP-specific business routines can 
threaten established core, enabling and supplemental capabilities and related knowledge 
sets. The integration of SAP’s embedded business routines and reporting functionality 
contributed to the creation of (a)  highly rigid reporting structures; (b) inflexible managerial 
decision-making routines; and (c) reduced autonomy on the factory floor in the firm studied. 
SAP thus endangered the firm-specific knowledge creating activities that underpinned core 
operational capabilities in this organization. Finally, Leonard-Barton’s conceptual 
framework is extended to incorporate insights into the manner in which ERP systems such as 
SAP affect the various aspects of organizational knowledge sets.  
Keywords 
Enterprise Resource Systems, SAP, Firm-Specific Knowledge, Core Capabilities 
1. Introduction 
Previous research on enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems centers on business 
modeling, product development issues, the life cycle of ERP systems, and the knowledge 
required to manage the implementation of ERP systems (Esteves and Pastor 2001). Studies of 
ERP system implementation and use, which focus on knowledge and its management, 
address such issues as (a) change management around ERP system implementation (Al-
Mashhari 2000); (b) senior managers’ perspectives on knowledge management in ERP 
environments (Klaus & Gable 2000); (c) knowledge requirements for ERP systems 
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implementation and management (Jones and Price 2001); (d) the relationship between ERP, 
knowledge and organizational effectiveness (Hedman 2000); and (e) ERP systems and the 
integration of knowledge in organization (Esteves & Pastor 2001). There is, nevertheless, a 
paucity of research on how ERP systems influence extant knowledge creation activities and 
associated core capabilities in organizations.  
This lacuna is addressed in the present paper, which deepens the IS field’s understanding of 
the relationship between the introduction of ERP systems and the core capabilities of 
manufacturing organizations. Leonard-Barton’s (1995) research illustrates that knowledge 
creation activities such as problems solving, experimentation, importation of external 
expertise, and the introduction of new methodologies and tools underpin the development of 
firm-specific knowledge sets. She argues that such knowledge sets give rise to core 
capabilities. The following analysis of the ERP literature helps illustrate the relevance of 
Leonard-Barton’s theoretical perspective as this study’s conceptual framework. 
2. The Promise and Reality of ERP Systems  
More and more firms are turning to ERP systems to leverage knowledge assets at all levels in 
the organization. So much so, ERP systems have replaced legacy systems in informating and 
automating core business  processes (Holland, Light. & Kalwalek 1999). This trend is 
reflected by Davenport (1998, p. 122) who states that “the business world’s embrace of 
enterprise systems may in fact be the most important development in the corporate use of 
information technology in the 1990s.” By 1999, a total of 53,000 firms worldwide had 
implemented ERP systems (Cerullo & Cerullo 2000). Unlike legacy systems, ERP systems 
tend to take the form of customizable software packages. Leading vendors are SAP, Oracle, 
Peoplesoft, Baan, and J. D. Edwards, with SAP being the dominant market player. Cooke and 
Peterson (1998) illustrate that the principle reasons why firms implement SAP R/3 is to 
standardize business processes and support globalization of activities. Despite its popularity, 
however, SAP does not have a reputation for being user-friendly (Stedman 1999). For 
example, Caldwell and Stein (1998) found that managers at Amaco refused to operate SAP 
because they found it to be user-unfriendly. Another drawback concerns customization— 
Holsapple and Sena (1999) observe that while software modifications of SAP modules are 
possible, they are not recommended. The rationale for this is that organizations implementing 
ERP systems wish to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of business processes by 
importing best practices embedded in software like SAP (Curran & Ladd 1998, Bancroft 
1998). For that reason, firms rarely attempt customization, as less than 5% of the Fortune 
1000 companies customized an ERP system to support idiosyncratic business processes 
(Davis 1998). Hence, most organizations adapt or reengineer their business processes to 
accommodate SAP modules. This has prompted some to argue that the implementation of an 
ERP system should be considered a business project rather than an IS project (Shanks, Parr, 
Hu, Corbitt, Thanasankit & Sheddon 2000). Davenport (1998) highlights that ERP systems 
generate an imperative to establish common business and information technology processes 
across diverse functional boundaries in organizations. This has major implications for the 
roles and actions of organizational actors (Hanseth & Braa 1998).  Furthermore, it has 
enormous implications for firm-specific knowledge sets, as researchers in the resource-based 
view hold that an organization’s knowledge is embedded in its organizational and managerial 
processes, business routines and practices (Leonard-Barton 1995). 
 
Butler, Pyke ERP Systems, Firm-Specific Knowledge and Core Capabilities  
 
 
 
Institutional 
Economics 
Institutional 
Sociology 
Philosophy Psychology 
Phenomenology 
Hermeneutics 
Epistemology 
Learning Theory 
Decision Theory 
Cognitive Theory 
Cultural Psychology 
Organizational 
Learning, 
Strategic Management 
Organization Theory
  
Resource-, Competence-, 
and Knowledge-Based 
theories of the Firm 
Human Capital Theory 
 
Social Construction of 
Knowledge           
Commitment Theory 
 
Regulative                   Normative            and        Cognitive Theories 
 
Leonard-Barton’s Theory of 
Knowledge Creating Activities, 
Knowledge Sets, Core Rigidities and 
Capabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Foundations of Leonard Barton's Theory of Knowledge Creating Activities, 
Knowledge Sets, Core Rigidities and Capabilities 
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3. A Framework for Building Organizational 
Knowledge Sets and Core Capabilities 
Leonard-Barton (1995) argues that a firm’s core capabilities arise out of its knowledge 
creating activities. In articulating her theory, Leonard-Barton integrates several theoretical 
perspectives with her own empirical research: Figure 1 indicates the related disciplines, 
theories and research streams that she draws upon to build her conceptual framework. 
Leonard-Barton’s theory of firm-specific competencies posits three types of organizational 
capability viz. core, enabling and supplemental (See Figure 2). She argues that core 
capabilities provide a firm with a sustainable competitive advantage; hence, they are 
distinguished from supplemental and enabling capabilities. Leonard-Barton conceptualizes a 
core capability as a firm-specific knowledge set, this, she argues, is reflected in a firm’s 
values and norms, physical technical systems, employee knowledge and skills, and 
managerial systems. Figure 3 captures these four dimensions to firm-specific knowledge sets. 
 
 
 
Supplemental Capabilities
“… add value to core capabilities but that could be imitated  - for 
example particular distribution channels or strong but not unique 
packaging design skills” 
 (1995, p. 4)
Enabling Capabilities
“..are necessary but not sufficient in themselves to 
competitively distinguish a company” 
 (1995, p. 4)
 
Core Capability
“ is a knowledge set that distinguishes
and provides a competitive 
advantage.” 
(1992, p. 113)
Degree of 
Strategic 
Importance 
Low
High
 
Figure 2 A Taxonomy of Capabilities: Core, Enabling and Supplemental  (Adapted from 
research by Leonard-Barton) 
 
With some notable exceptions (e.g., Barney 1986), the influence of values and norms are not 
usually associated with the creation of core capabilities. Leonard-Barton (1995) illustrates 
that values and norms can be dynamic and positive, or they can act to preserve outmoded 
routines and capabilities, contributing to the creation of core rigidities.  Leonard Barton 
(1992) argues that core rigidities are essentially redundant and inefficient organizational 
practices and routines. These are shaped by dysfunctional values and norms that fail to 
evolve and to meet the challenges in a dynamic and changing environment. Hence, 
dysfunctional values and norms are argued to constrain the development of new knowledge 
sets and associated productive capabilities. Nevertheless, Leonard-Barton (1995) argues that 
dynamic knowledge creating activities counter the problem of core rigidities by ensuring that 
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new knowledge circulates, in so doing, revitalizes firms and the communities-of-practice that 
constitute them. Figure 4 presents a model of the knowledge creating activities that underpin 
the development of firm-specific knowledge in the each of the dimensions to an 
organization’s knowledge set. As with extant perspectives on the resource-based view of the 
firm, Leonard-Barton highlights the role that problem solving, experimentation, importing 
expertise from outside the firm, and implementing and integrating new methodologies plays 
in shaping a firm’s knowledge set by acting on all four of the dimensions previously 
delineated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[T]hese determine what kinds of knowledge are 
sought and nurtured, what kinds of knowledge-
building activities are tolerated and encouraged. 
There are systems of caste and status, rituals of 
behaviour, and passionate beliefs associated with 
various kinds of technological knowledge that are 
as rigid and as complex as those associated with 
religion. Therefore, values serve as knowledge-
screening and control mechanisms (Leonard-
Barton , 1995, p. 19) 
Physical  Technical Systems 
Employee Knowledge and 
Skill  
Knowledge Sets
Values and Norms 
Technological competence 
accumulates not only in the 
heads of people; it also 
accumulates in the physical 
systems that they build over 
time – databases, machinery, 
and software programs  
(Leonard-Barton, 1995, p. 19)
[T]his skills/knowledge dimension 
encompasses both techniques 
specific to the firm and scientific    
[public] understanding (Leonard-
Barton, 1995, p. 20) 
 Managerial systems  
[O]rganized routine guiding 
resource accumulation and 
deployment (Leonard-Barton, 
1995, p.22) 
Capabilities
Knowledge 
Creating 
Activities 
 
Figure 3 Values and Norms, Physical Technical Systems, Employee Knowledge and Skills, 
and Managerial Systems as Firm-Specific KnowledgeSets 
 
Butler, Pyke ERP Systems, Firm-Specific Knowledge and Core Capabilities  
3.1 Research Objective  
This study’s objective is to explore the organizational consequences and outcomes of 
importing ‘best practice’ embedded in ERP systems, such as SAP, as non firm-specific 
organizational routines. Of special interest is the organizational ability to maintain successful 
knowledge creating activities and knowledge sets relevant to its core capabilities, while at 
the same time, overcoming potential core rigidities. Formally stated, this study’s research 
objective is: 
To deepen the IS field’s understanding of SAP’s influence on firm-specific knowledge 
creating activities, knowledge sets, and associated core, enabling and supplemental 
capabilities through the importation and implementation of non-firm specific routines, 
embodying industry-wide best practice.  
Leonard-Barton’s (1992, 1995) theory of knowledge creating activities and the resultant 
knowledge sets that underpin core, enabling and supplemental capabilities is used as 
conceptual framework to structure the case report and its findings. This operates to direct 
attention on the operational core capabilities, knowledge creating activities, and knowledge 
sets in order to evaluate the affect that SAP has on each.   
 
 
Formal and informal 
experimentation (to build 
capabilities for the future) 
 
 
Importation of Expertise 
Knowledge 
Creating 
Activities 
Shared, creative problem 
solving (to produce current 
products) 
 Implementing and 
integrating new 
methodologies and tools (to 
enhance internal operations)
 
 Figure 4 Knowledge Creating Activities (Adapted from Leonard-Barton 1995) 
4. A Case-based Research Strategy 
A naturalistic research approach was adopted for the present study.  Accordingly, a 
qualitative, interpretive, case-based research strategy was implemented with reference to 
constructivist thought in the social sciences (see Lincoln & Guba 1985, Stake 1995) and 
interpretivist approaches in the IS field (Walsham 1995).  Stake (1995) contends that case 
studies can be intrinsic, instrumental, or collective in focus. An instrumental case study is 
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one where the case forms a backdrop or context and is of secondary importance. Such a study 
is undertaken to validate a theory or to explore a particular phenomenon as it is manifested in 
the case. Yin (1994, p. 42) argues that a case may “involve more than one unit of analysis … 
such as meetings, roles, or locations,” this he terms an “embedded case study design.” The 
present study incorporates an instrumental case study incorporating two embedded units of 
analysis. 
The case selected for study is the Boxit Group, an Irish owned and managed transnational 
corporation specializing in the manufacture of packing cases and associated materials. Boxit 
Group and its affiliates employ over 43,000 people in 23 countries worldwide. Two 
production facilities constitute the embedded units of analysis—Boxit Corrugated Cases 
(BCC) and Boxit Corrugated Services (BCS). The embedded units were purposively selected 
because they posses different operational core capabilities, knowledge sets and knowledge 
creating activities, and were in different stages of development—BCC was established in 
1973 and BCS in 1998. Both participated in the roll-out of the corporate ERP system, which 
involved the implementation of SAP’s Financial and Purchasing modules—the latter of 
which included support for the engineering maintenance of production equipment at both 
plants.  
Purposeful sampling was employed throughout. Research was conducted in 2001 at two sites. 
Twenty social actors participated in the study, through formal and informal interviews over a 
period of several months. Each of the formal interviews was tape-recorded, while extensive 
case notes were taken on informal conversations and observations while on-site at the 
research locations. A wealth of documentary evidence was also gathered. Naturalist 
techniques were employed to analyze and report on the research data (see Lincoln & Guba 
1985; Stake 1995).         
5. Core Operational Capabilities at BCC and BCS 
The Boxit Corrugated Cases (BCC) manufacturing plant supplies the dairy and food sectors 
with packaging materials. The packaging requirements of such customers are easily projected 
and facilitate large production runs by BCC with minimum change in its standard operational 
routines.  The emergence of a dynamic and highly successful electronics industry in Ireland 
during the early 1990s presented new market opportunities for the Boxit Group. Firms in this 
emergent sector had radically different, more sophisticated, and varied packaging 
requirements than those of BCC’s traditional customer base. While exciting new 
opportunities were presented, so too were possible negative consequences associated with the 
dynamic, market-led production schedules and idiosyncratic needs of the electronics 
industry. This arose because firms operating in the electronics sector could not provide 
suppliers with the exact delivery schedules. Suppliers had to respond quickly, and on short 
notice. However, the production capabilities of BCC were not aligned with the needs of firms 
operating in the electronics industry, as BCC’s Customer Services Manger pointed out that:  
…customers’ requirements [in the electronics sector] range from pallets to foam inserts to 
cartons—this is not BCC’s core business and is not cost effective for us to engage in this 
work.  
BCC’s core capabilities were de facto core rigidities when it came to servicing the 
requirements of the electronic industry, while altering values and norms in the company. 
After several unsuccessful attempts to reconfigure its production routines, BCC’s 
management considered that smaller production runs and products with non-standard 
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specifications were too disruptive to the efficient operation of the plant. Thus, due to the need 
to maintain its lucrative revenue flows from existing markets, management at BCC were 
unable and unwilling to adapt its production activities to service the electronics market.  The 
choice was clear to BCC, cede the new niche market to other companies, or establish a 
production facility with core production capabilities to deliver the product and service in a 
way that met customer’s requirements. Hence, Boxit Corrugated Services (BCS) was 
established to service the packaging needs of the dynamic electronics industry.  
While the BCC was unable to reconfigure its asset and capability portfolios to meet the 
dynamic demands of the electronics sector, it did possess a tradition of introducing technical 
innovation in its production processes through the knowledge creation activities of its 
employees, coupled with the introduction of new technology. For example, BCC pioneered 
the process of four-colour printing on corrugated packaging. Consequently, it was five to ten 
years ahead of the competition in terms of its technical capabilities.  Evidence of this firm-
specific ‘knowledge set’ comes from BCC’s Production Manager:   
[Competitors] cannot get the same print quality from the four-colour machines, despite 
having very good machinery. The difference is down to skills. They have four-colour 
machines in Lurgan and Dublin and they cannot produce the same quality as we can in 
[BCC].  They would have broadly the same machines, so it’s down to skills.  
BCC’s management was aware that capability-based advantages erode over time; hence, it 
upgraded production equipment on a regular basis. Significantly, the installation, operation, 
and customization of new technology provided a platform for knowledge creation and 
capability development, as the production manager commented: 
In the past, operators quickly mastered the knowledge and skills required to run new 
technologies. When a technological investment has matured, in terms of quality and 
efficiency of output, we assess our competitors’ positions and when we determine that they 
are closing the gap, in terms of quality and output, we invest again.  
Thus, BCC coupled learning-by-doing with the experiential knowledge of long serving staff 
to produce and retain skills and related knowledge in a tacit form—in the production area this 
method of learning was known as Standing-by-Nanny. Group learning was critical here as 
production operators worked in teams of four. In this scheme of things, a lead operator 
assumed responsibility for training other members of the team. This helped build and 
reinforce a team’s norms and values and enabled knowledge and skill transfers. This 
approach to mentoring was widely used in all Boxit’s production facilities. A training 
manager usually facilitated the process, as management was mindful that success in such 
endeavors could not be left to the communication skills of the lead operator. This approach to 
organizational learning created a highly idiosyncratic production-oriented knowledge and 
skills resource within the Boxit group of companies. Thus knowledge and skills developed 
over time through learning-by-doing and was transmitted through socialization within and 
between in communities-of-practice.  
When the BCS facility was established in 1998 to meet the idiosyncratic needs of the 
electronics sector, BCS’ plant manager opted not replicate BCC’s operational routines by 
transferring workers and work practices from BCC. Thus, BCS did not directly import the 
knowledge and skills and associated values and norms of BCC’s workforce. His aim was to 
introduce more flexible operational routines that would help BCS to meet the particular 
needs of the electronics sector; to achieve this, he felt that a radically different set of values 
and norms needed to be established in the new plant—values and norms that were congruent 
with the use of emergent technologies, like SAP. By so doing, he wished to avoid introducing 
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rigidities associated with outdated conditions of employment, including, for example, pay 
differentials and demarcation. He clearly recognized that this might prevent the attainment of 
flexibility in the manufacturing process deemed to be critical to the success of BCS. 
Nevertheless, the knowledge and skills of workers at BCC were recognized as being valuable 
to the new operation at BCS. The problem was how to import much-needed knowledge and 
skills while filtering out the rigidities and inappropriate knowledge sets associated with the 
managerial systems, values and norms at BCC. Accordingly, BCS’ new plant manager 
decided to use technology to import the required experiential knowledge and skills while, at 
the same time, instituting a different set of values and norms through the process of 
socialization. However, his first task was to install the production plant. This had been 
sourced from BCC, which was in the process of upgrading its production facilities. In order 
to operate the machines, workers had to adopt appropriate operational routines: this 
constituted the importation of explicit knowledge and skills from BCC. The importation of 
tacit knowledge proved difficult to address, however explicit knowledge of efficiency levels, 
quality parameters, and maintenance routines proved easier to import. A task made all the 
easier when SAP was introduced, as these were eventually programmed into SAP’s 
purchasing module. 
While the forgoing describes operational routines at both plants, an understanding of the 
forces underpinning managerial decision-making is also important. Before the introduction of 
SAP, Boxit Group’s general management philosophy ensured that operational managers had 
significant autonomy to run their logistics, production and marketing activities with respect 
to local conditions. Boxit found that this strategy helped develop strong local management 
teams who understood, and were responsive to, the fluctuations in demand for the products 
produced in their plants. Regional manufacturing and sales operations were monitored and 
controlled by Boxit’s corporate management team through a system of regular financial 
reporting and review, coupled with tight capital and operating expense controls. This regional 
decentralization and close central monitoring coupled with performance related incentives for 
local managers provided motivation for improvements in performance. The implementation 
of SAP changed both the reporting structure and the way in which the organization measures 
and improves performance at plant level.  
6. The Implementation of SAP and its Effect on Core 
Capabilities, Knowledge Sets and Knowledge 
Creating Activities  
As with most organizations that introduce SAP, Boxit’s corporate management employed a 
firm of consultants to help implement the system—this constituted an importation of 
expertise. However, Boxit’s management considered that it was necessary for consultants to 
be familiar with its industry and culture, if they were to leverage fully their knowledge and 
skills. Hence, Boxit attempted to train the consultants in its business routines and inculcate 
them in its values and norms. This proved unproductive and expensive, consequently Boxit’s 
IT Function opted to train selected end-users to the level of SAP super-users. The rationale 
behind this was to have super-users provide one-on-one training to other staff, thereby 
increasing the skill level and commitment of end-users. Managers noted that super-users had 
developed a valuable and unique knowledge set. They understood Boxit’s business 
processes, industry dynamics, and the capabilities of SAP. The role of the super-user evolved 
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to one of redesigning the way in which staff implemented business routines and integrating 
SAP’s routines with the ‘Boxit way’. 
6.1 An Examination of SAP’s Influence on Operational 
Capabilities at Boxit 
One of Boxit’s primary goals was to use SAP to standardize the performance of each of its 
manufacturing plants. As the Human Resource Manager notes:  
[W]e have identified approximately 25 key performance criteria for our plants. If we could 
transpose the average of the top ten across all firms then our bottom line would be 
transformed. 
While recognizing that each manufacturing plant has its own values and norms, the HR 
manager expected that SAP would help to define the appropriate mix of resources to ensure 
that plants improved their performance, as measured by these key performance indicators. 
Hence, through SAP, production output from the same make and model of machine operating 
in production plants in different locations were compared and analyzed for efficiencies. 
Performance that varied from the accepted norm was the subject of remedial action. Once the 
best practice was identified, it was adapted and applied to all of the firm’s operations. SAP 
therefore facilitated the identification of ‘slacks’ through benchmarking of activities. 
However, the managers of individual plants argued that such ‘slacks’ were beneficial for 
competence development. 
The implementation of SAP provided Boxit’s management with an opportunity to attempt 
operational change in structure and process in several areas, as the IT manager pointed out: 
 [W]e have seen a major change in the structure of the organization since SAP has been 
introduced. For the first time in the corporation’s history a senior vice president with 
responsibility for purchasing was appointed. 
The information SAP provided enabled the Senior Vice President to negotiate the purchase of 
raw materials, such as starch, in bulk for Boxit’s entire European operation. The savings 
were significant at corporate level, but centralized purchasing prevented plant managers from 
sourcing raw materials locally, thereby introducing time efficiencies and cost savings at the 
plant level. Thus, they felt that SAP prevented them from lowering the overall cost of 
production at their plants. Worse still, according to the plant managers, SAP’s dynamic 
reporting capability enabled corporate management to make ad hoc inquires and to drill 
down and examine performance in greater detail than ever before. As a manager of BCS 
explained: 
Now the theory is that we will all run on SAP…from a sheet plant point of view SAP is a 
nightmare, I mean it is an enormous amount of work for no benefits at all. In fact it adds cost 
to the operation here. For a corrugated plant it has obvious benefits, for an accountant 
sitting in Paris it is brilliant because he can see everything and he can drill-down into any 
level of detail he wants, down to what machines are producing what. Obviously, this leaves 
comparison wide open. 
Local managers were concerned that variances attributable to fluctuations in local demand 
were not understood at corporate headquarters. Analyzing performance using limited criteria, 
they argue, risked producing misleading results; especially if SAP’s non-firm specific 
operational routines were misaligned with local conditions. BCS managers therefore 
contended that in order to assess the performance of plants in disparate locations, local 
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factors must be taken into account. For example, inventory was sometimes maintained at 
high levels due to local agreements with customers, while underutilized production capacity 
was often due the seasonal fluctuations in the firm’s customer base. Hence, some plants 
might not compare favorably with others serving different customer groupings, or when 
compared with the requirements of firms in the same industry operating in different regions. 
Managers at BCC and BCS felt that this process might be used as a lever to increase 
operating efficiencies irrespective of local contingencies. They also argued that SAP-enabled 
benchmarking of units acted as a barrier to innovation.  
In order to compare favourably with other units, managers at BCS and BCC were under 
pressure to commit their resources to maximize current performance; however, as resources 
were finite they were to unable dedicate sufficient ‘slacks’ to help maintain plant-specific 
innovation through knowledge creating activities. The temptation for local managers was to 
leave their successors allocate the required resources to develop the capabilities necessary to 
address future problems and opportunities. Hence, managers underlined that SAP-enabled 
benchmarking had to involve more than comparing the costs of a series of activities or 
services required to produce the products. Using this criterion, there was no accounting for 
intangible resources such as knowledge and skills. Under SAP, this was considered a cost 
rather than a learning opportunity. It is long recognized that knowledge redundancy is 
essential for the well-being of a learning organization and its knowledge creating activities. 
Managers and operational staff at BCS and BCC were of the opinion that SAP endangered 
the organizational learning process as it led managers to concentrate on attaining short-term 
quantifiable gains, thereby depleting the firm’s ‘wellsprings of knowledge’.  
6.2 Transferring Explicit Knowledge and Operational Skills 
Through SAP  
Attitudes toward SAP varied, however, BCC’s production manager identified that it had the 
potential to solve problems that were emerging in the workforce by educating technicians as 
they performed their duties. When experience maintenance technicians found solutions to 
problems with manufacturing equipment, they recorded them using the facility supplied by 
SAP. Thus SAP permitted the explicit experiential knowledge of technicians to be captured 
and transferred to less-experienced co-workers. This was seen as supporting Boxit’s 
learning-by-doing philosophy—except in this case ‘Standing-by-Nanny’ was effectively 
augmented by a ‘Standing-by-SAP’ approach. SAP’s capabilities in effecting knowledge 
transfers were reported by the BCC’s production manager viz.  
 We [were] starting to lose maintenance personnel [to other companies] and the information 
which the [SAP] system provide[d] help[ed] new maintenance personnel, who ha[d] no 
experience of working with packaging equipment. The information on the system provide[d] 
points of reference to help technicians to diagnose and rectify problems. Consequently, each 
technician [was] aware of work previously undertaken on each machine. 
Ironically, the manager at BCS, who later was highly critical of SAP, exploited this facility 
early on to help transfer explicit knowledge of the operation and maintenance of former BCC 
plant to BCS, thus avoiding the importation of what were operational core rigidities at BCC.  
Nevertheless, the maintenance community perceived the introduction of SAP as an additional 
method of supervision and quality control. They objected to the implementation of SAP on 
the basis that it required them to do additional clerical work and it distorted the existing chain 
of command within their department. 
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acceptance and efficient use of the system. 
 An ERP system may become a core 
rigidity and the new dominant knowledge 
set. 
 An ERP system challenges exiting tacit 
knowledge and skills. 
 An ERP system may act as a substitute 
for tacit knowledge. 
 In certain cases, an ERP system can 
support ‘learning- by-doing.  
 An ERP system make provide a 
corporate-wide uniform platform for the 
creation of explicit knowledge and skill. 
 An ERP system weakens lessens the 
hold that individuals or communities-
of-practice have on proprietary 
knowledge sets. 
 Investing in an ERP system introduces 
new challenges, new problems, new 
ideas, new skills, and new knowledge 
sets thereby invigorating the 
organization’s learning process and 
augmenting its knowledge asset in the 
short-to-medium  term. 
 An ERP system reduces the freedom of 
local management teams to allocate 
resources to develop operational firm-
specific core capabilities. 
 The system’s drill down and reporting 
capabilities changes the locus of control 
over decision making and leads to the 
creation of a tight centralized management 
structure and a more regimented 
knowledge creation process among line 
managers. 
 An ERP system needs to be managed in a 
sensitive way to accommodate firm-
specific knowledge creation at operational 
levels. 
 Benchmarking enabled by an ERP system 
can inhibit innovation and the 
development of management capabilities 
in the long-term. 
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As previously stated, communities-of-practice in the Boxit organization possessed a long 
held belief in the supremacy of experiential knowledge and the knowledge creating routine of 
learning-by-doing. The implementation of SAP caused a change in the values and norms of 
the organization in regard to the long-established primacy of tacit over explicit knowledge. 
Indeed, Boxit’s CEO was famous (or infamous) for his application of tacit knowledge in 
sizing up a competitor for potential takeover.  However, the consensus on the importance of 
tacit knowledge that had existed prior to the implementation of SAP was no long evident in 
2001. Local managers were concerned that this shift to SAP’s prepackaged solutions would 
ultimately dehumanize the manufacturing process and eliminate opportunities (or the 
motivation) for problem solving at plant level. Without such opportunities, much-prized 
problem-solving activities and core capabilities could be lost.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This study has shown that SAP can have a significant effect on an organization’s knowledge 
creating capabilities. Based on this study’s findings, Figure 5 presents an integrative model 
of ERP system implementation that captures the salient issues surrounding, and 
consequences of, such endeavors. Briefly, the findings illustrate that the introduction of 
routines of ‘best practice’ via SAP had unanticipated consequences for knowledge creating 
activities at management and operational levels which challenged the knowledge sets on 
which unit-specific core capabilities were based. When imaginatively applied, SAP helped 
negate potential core rigidities, particularly where explicit knowledge was transferred 
between manufacturing units. Nevertheless, managers and operational staff felt that SAP (a) 
endangered tried and tested learning routines; (b) attenuated valuable knowledge creating 
activities; (c) depleted the firm’s intangible knowledge assets; and (d) threatened established 
core, enabling and supplemental capabilities. The dynamic reporting capability of SAP to 
make ad hoc inquires, to drill down, and to examine managerial and operational performance 
in greater detail than ever before, contributed to the creation of a rigid, centralized 
management structure and further reduced the autonomy of plant managers and operational 
staff. This signaled a shift in emphasis from tacit to explicit knowledge, and changed the 
system of values and norms within the organization.  
In conclusion, this paper argues that organizations should take extant knowledge creating 
activates, such as tried and tested firm-specific routines for problem solving, organizational 
learning, and decision-making into account when implementing SAP modules. Hence, senior 
management must regard SAP as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. Accordingly, 
business and IT managers should apply SAP in a sensitive and judicious manner, rather than 
be driven by its capabilities. Finally, it is clear that SAP has the potential to become the 
dominant knowledge set within an organization and therefore has the potential to become a 
core rigidity in itself. 
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